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I. INTRODUCTION
When I worked at the public defender’s office in Chicago, I found
that stereotypes and prejudice are problems for everyone, not just the
prosecution or the judiciary—although it was more acute there.1 I entered
the office thinking that public defenders were liberal (which is, in my
mind, a good thing) and thus “good” on race issues. Not so much.
There is no person without prejudices, myself included. Let me illustrate what I mean with an anecdote. I was in my tenth year or so at the
office and a supervisor in the Homicide Task Force, which is a unit that
represents persons accused of homicide. When I was a line member of
the unit, I carried between twenty and twenty-nine murder cases at any
given time, about one-quarter to one-third of which were death penalty
cases.2 The Task Force was a vertical representation unit, which meant
that we picked up the case and client in preliminary hearing court and
traveled with him wherever he went. Most of the office, however, pro∗
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vided horizontal representation, despite efforts to implement vertical representation in all cases.3 Horizontal representation means that the assistant public defenders are each assigned to a certain courtroom, and they
represent all indigent folks who come into that courtroom. With such a
large county and office,4 any other form of organization would be difficult. But one of the problems for client relations is that by the time the
client works his way up to the felony courtroom, he has been in several
courtrooms5 and has been represented by a number of different lawyers
in the office.
This situation had occurred on the day I wish to write about. As I
mentioned, I was a supervisor, but I did not supervise the lawyer I am
about to describe. I will call him Paul. He was a white man in his late
forties or early fifties—a career public defender. He was back in the
lockup talking to a client, as was I. Behind every courtroom in the criminal courts are lockups where pretrial detainees wait until their cases are
called. This particular lockup is about fifty by twenty feet, with open bars
so you could approach your client and speak to him through the bars with
no obstruction. There is a “privacy panel” with a toilet toward the back.
It isn’t very private, and you learn to ignore it and not “see” it.
On this day, I was trying to speak to my client again about the motions we were filing and reporting to him about an investigation. Since
these lockups are not very private—there can be as many as thirty or forty men back there (usually all are men of color)—I told my client that we
would discuss everything more when I came to see him at the jail later
that week. But I could hardly even say that much because Paul was yelling at his client nearby. From what I could gather, this client had been
arrested later than his codefendant. Paul had worked out what he believed was an advantageous plea for the codefendant. I am sure it was a
good plea deal, but he was meeting this client for the first time and was
trying to strong-arm him into taking the deal, as it was apparently a
package for either both codefendants or neither. Paul called him stupid.
He used pejorative terms such as “mope” and “ignorant gangbanger.” He

3. See ROGER PRZYBYLSKI ET AL., TRENDS AND ISSUES, 1997: ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE
INFORMATION AUTHORITY 77 (1997).
4. “The Office of the Cook County Public Defender is the second largest public defender’s
office in the nation, with more than 500 attorneys providing indigent defense service in the largest
county in the State.” State of Illinois Capital Punishment Commission Members, ILL. DEP’T OF
CORR., http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/member_info.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
5. The defendant probably appeared in bond court, made one or more appearances in preliminary hearing court where he may have been represented by a different public defender each time,
and also appeared in arraignment court. It is unlikely that he has been visited by a lawyer at the jail if
he is detained (and most indigent clients cannot make bond), so the defendant often appears in the
felony courtroom between three to six weeks later, and with only in-court representation.
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told the client that he—the client—could “do six [years] standing on his
head.” And worse.
I was pretty sure that Paul would never have spoken to a white
eighteen- or nineteen-year-old young man in the same demeaning way.
They were both yelling at each other, and the entire lockup was listening.
I doubt that the interaction was a product of Paul’s conscious thought,
but it is this unconscious bias that is so difficult to address and therefore
is the focus of this Article.
I was not Paul’s supervisor, but I asked him to step out of the lockup with me. I wanted to tell him that he was being disrespectful and that
even if this was the best deal for the client, the client had no confidence
in Paul, and he was making it impossible for the client to maintain any
sort of pride and accept it by fronting him off like that. I did not want to
do the same to Paul though, so that is why I asked him to step out with
me. He turned to me and snapped that he was busy. I told him so was I,
and then proceeded to say everything I intended, plus I added, “Paul, this
man is the reason you have a job. Show him some damn respect.” He
was furious with me, and I made a permanent enemy that day.
Later that week, I recounted this incident at a supervisors’ meeting
and suggested that we do something about the office and what I perceived to be racial attitudes coupled with the burnout that this work engenders. I said, “We all have prejudices—me too—but as public defenders, we should try to at least know that and discount for it in some way.”
I asked my colleagues if they thought that Paul would have perceived
this young man as being able to do six years “standing on his head” if he
had been white, middle-class, and from a suburb. My comments were
dismissed as being overly sensitive (read: female), and the meeting proceeded to other matters. I looked around the room and realized that there
were only one or two women or people of color in our ranks. Maybe that
was the problem.
After the meeting, one of the African-American supervisors told me
that I “had done it now.” I asked him what he meant. “It’s one thing if I
speak about race,” he replied. “It’s viewed as self-interest. But if you do
it, it is viewed as betrayal.” When I went out to my car that night, both
front tires had been slashed. I will never know for sure if it was related to
what I said in that meeting, but I have my suspicions.
Despite the repercussions I suffered for voicing concerns about racial biases in the work of public defenders, I will continue to advocate
that, as defense lawyers, we must be conscious of our own racial biases,
especially when interacting with our own clients and when selecting a
jury through voir dire. We must not take a “color-blind” approach to our
representation because it is in the very recognition of color that we can
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recognize our own biases and ensure that they do not inhibit our ability
to represent our clients.
This Article will proceed with a discussion of race bias and will examine who in the criminal justice system has such biases. These concepts
will provide a backdrop to the next Part, where I will turn to an analysis
about the need for criminal defense lawyers to be conscious of race bias.
I focus on two specific circumstances in which awareness of one’s own
racial bias is imperative: interacting with clients and voir dire. But first,
we must come to an understanding about the nature of race bias itself.
II. JIM CROW IS GONE,6 SO WHY ALL THIS TALK OF RACE BIAS?
This Part will explore the foundational concepts behind racial bias
in the criminal justice system. It will first clarify the definition of racial
bias and how it manifests both explicitly and implicitly in our lives.
Next, this Part will discuss who in the criminal justice system has racial
bias—prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers alike.
A. What Is Racial Bias?
Although overt racism is still palpable in today’s world, unconscious racism and biases often play a role in our everyday decisions. Racial biases might cause us to “treat members of different racial groups
disparately.”7 There are two different types of bias: explicit and implicit.8
Explicit bias refers to the kinds of bias that people knowingly express
and sometimes embrace.9 This type of bias has prompted many procedural safeguards in the criminal justice system. In Batson v. Kentucky,
for example, the United States Supreme Court held that when the defense
believes the prosecution is exercising peremptory challenges on the basis
of racial discrimination, the defense is permitted to object.10 If the trial
judge finds a prima facie case of racially motivated peremptory strikes,
the prosecution must then provide “race-neutral” reasons for the exclusions.11 This safeguard is meant to discourage the explicit bias expressed
when a prosecutor removes people of color from the jury simply because
of their race.12 While explicit bias like this does exist within the criminal
6. While overt and codified racism is gone, racism is not. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Jim
Crow’s Long Goodbye, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 107 (2004).
7. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035,
2044 (2011).
8. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2009).
9. Id.
10. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
11. Id. at 97.
12. Id. at 99.
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justice system and is potentially the reason for some racial disparities, it
is not the only culprit.13
Implicit bias is also to blame, yet it is less visible. Usually, implicit
bias is so subtle or ingrained that those who hold the bias are not aware
of it.14 Implicit biases are especially difficult to discuss because even
when we are in touch with them, we are unlikely to admit to or address
our own implicit racial biases.15 This is challenging when addressing racial disparities in the criminal justice system16 because “[o]nce activated,
implicit stereotypes and attitudes can negatively influence individuals’
judgments and behaviors toward racial minorities in ways that they are
unaware of and largely unable to control.”17 Biases can influence one’s
interpretation of benign behavior, causing one to read identical behaviors
differently based on the race of the actor.18
Moreover, studies have shown that we engage in “race loyalty,” assuming the best in people who match our race because of our desire to
see our race (and ourselves) positively:
[A] decision maker is engaged in what [researchers] call a form of
“racial loyalty” in which “he attributes the more positive stereotype
of the white person” as superior, more qualified (despite the same
credentials), more intelligent, more deserving and more hardworking in order “to avoid attributing negative characteristics to
white people and himself.” To avoid lowering his own self-image,
the racially identifying decision-maker must elevate the white applicant over the black applicant. This loyalty to other white people

13. Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1196 (“[R]esearchers have found a marked decline in
explicit bias over time, even as disparities in outcomes persist.”); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 88.
14. Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1196.
15. Id. As defined by Dovidio & Gaertner, “[M]ost whites also develop some negative feelings
toward or beliefs about blacks, of which they are unaware or which they try to dissociate from their
nonprejudiced self-images.” J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 4 (2004), quoted in Hart Blanton & James Jaccard, Unconscious
Racism: A Concept in Pursuit of a Measure, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 277, 278 (2008); see also JOE R.
FEAGIN ET AL., WHITE RACISM 186–217 (2d ed. 2001) (Studies show that most whites deny they are
racially prejudiced despite empirical evidence revealing widespread racial discrimination against
African-Americans.); Frank M. McClellan, Judicial Impartiality & Recusal: Reflections on the Vexing Issue of Racial Bias, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 351, 352 (2005) (“[W]hile race consciousness remains a
dominant feature of the American social fabric in the 21st century, few individuals refuse to
acknowledge that their words or conduct may reflect a racial bias.”).
16. Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1196.
17. Richardson, supra note 7, at 2043.
18. Id.
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occurs in order to fulfill the individual’s quest for a positive selfimage.19

This research alone shows the importance for all people, especially those
in the criminal justice system, to understand racial bias and how it affects
the conduct and opinions of the beholder.
B. Who Has Racial Bias?
No one is immune from racial bias. Researchers have found that
most people, even those who embrace nondiscrimination norms, hold
implicit biases.20 In fact, research shows that people from all racial backgrounds “have implicit biases in the form of stereotypes and prejudices
that can negatively and nonconsciously affect [their] behavior.”21 Thus,
implicit bias is not just a problem for white people—people of all colors
have racial bias, even biases toward people that look like them.22 Even
those within marginalized groups have biases against one another because they internalize the majority’s stereotypes.23
Legal actors are not exempt from racial bias. Numerous studies
have detected racial bias among police officers, prosecutors, and judges.
One study showed that police officers, like the general public, have a
bias that “often assumes young black men are more dangerous or aggressive than others.”24 Applying these implicit biases to prosecutors, they
often assume that nonwhite jurors will be bad for their case if the defendant is also nonwhite. This bias is even institutionalized in some prosecutors’ offices, where prosecutors are instructed to come up with raceneutral explanations for striking black jurors to avoid Batson challenges.25 This tactic is rooted in the race-biased assumption that black jurors
will identify with black defendants.

19. Catherine Smith, Unconscious Bias and “Outsider” Interest Convergence, 40 CONN. L.
REV. 1077, 1086 (2008) (quoting Catherine E. Smith, The Group Dangers of Race-Based Conspiracies, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 55, 82–83 (2006)).
20. Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1196; Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact
of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 803
(2012); Task Force on Race & the Criminal Justice Sys., Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623, 664−65 (2012) [hereinafter Task Force
Report].
21. Richardson, supra note 7, at 2039. This bias often assumes young black men are more
dangerous or aggressive than others.
22. Id.
23. Smith, supra note 19, at 1087.
24. Richardson, supra note 7, at 2039.
25. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 253 (2005) (“Finally, the appearance of discrimination is
confirmed by widely known evidence of the general policy of the Dallas County District Attorney’s
Office to exclude black venire members from juries at the time Miller-El’s jury was selected.”).

2012] Importance of Consciousness for Criminal Defense Attorneys 761
Even judges—legal actors who are supposed to remain the most
unbiased and egalitarian actors in the legal system—possess racial biases:
Judges in particular want to believe that they can be fair to everyone
and perform their duties in a colorblind manner. However, judges
are not immune from the same racial biases affecting most Americans. In light of this reality, efforts to identify and mitigate or eliminate racial bias on the part of a judge or an attorney pose unique
problems.26

In another study, researchers completed a multipart analysis involving a
large sample of trial judges from around the country.27 Researchers found
that “judges harbor the same kinds of implicit biases as others; that these
biases can influence their judgment; but that given sufficient motivation,
judges can compensate for the influence of these biases.”28 While these
findings are disheartening, they also lend hope to the idea that these biases are not invisible or immutable. Actors in the legal system can
acknowledge some of their biases and overcome them.
During my years of trial experience, I have encountered firsthand
the biases of these legal actors. But I have also observed racial biases in
myself and other defense lawyers, and it usually comes with either a lack
of awareness or a resistance to addressing these biases. As shown in the
literature above, little has been written or discussed about the racial biases of defense lawyers, and how those biases could negatively affect our
clients if we do not acknowledge and monitor them. This Article aims to
begin filling the gap in the discourse and to make a case for why acknowledging and controlling racial biases is especially imperative for
criminal defense lawyers.
III. DEFENSE ATTORNEY BIAS: YES, IT IS A MORAL MATTER, AND A
PRACTICAL ONE AS WELL
As a defense attorney myself, I feel a responsibility to discuss and
acknowledge our biases—if not for our own sake, then for the sake of
our clients. This Part aims to discuss the biases we carry as defense at26. McClellan, supra note 15, at 352; see also Debra Cassens Moss, Judge Says He’s Sorry,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1987, at 21 (discussing Judge Arthur Cieslik, who made inappropriate comments
to women and minorities, including saying that “women should not be lawyers”). I practiced in front
of Judge Cieslik and was on the receiving end of some of his sexist comments. He also made racist
comments in the Derrick Morgan case, which engendered People v. Morgan, 568 N.E.2d 755 (Ill.
1991), rev’d, 504 U.S. 719 (1992). Among some of his comments, he called the two black lawyers
“laughing boy” and “smiling boy,” and suggested fumigating chambers after the two lawyers had
been there.
27. Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1195.
28. Id.
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torneys and average people, specifically the biases we exhibit when interacting with our own clients and when selecting a jury.
A. Defense Attorneys Also Have Bias, Even When Most
Clients Are People of Color
In light of the existing research that shows the power of our internal
biases,29 it is only natural that defense lawyers are not exempt from bias.
The difficulty is that these biases are not necessarily salient,30 and we are
often unaware that we have them at all. I am certain that the lawyer I
called Paul did not and would not see his actions as having any racial
component. I imagine he did not even see them as wrong because he
“knew what was best for the defendant,” even if the defendant did not.
His legal advice may have been correct, but his way of communicating
with his client was ineffective, and the moral implications of his conduct
were suspect at best.
Our clients rely on us for advice, and we should give it to them. But
we must also realize that major decisions belong to the client.31 Our best
advice will be ignored if we cannot communicate with our clients, and
this reality requires us to give respect as well as demand it. It also means
that we have to understand that we may not see our clients clearly.
We defense lawyers must be conscious of our own racial biases, or
else our clients will suffer. As Lois Heaney stated:
[T]he myth of “color blindness,” like all other efforts to deny the
fact and effect of prejudice, bias and oppression, works only to the
benefit of those who are not the object of prejudice. Denying the existence of racism . . . does nothing to correct its effects inside or
outside the courtroom, but rather undermines and jeopardizes the
credibility of the justice system, and serves to compound harm to
our clients.32

I will discuss this issue both with respect to the attorney-client relationship and how it affects the process of jury selection. Through these two
29. See, e.g., Rachlinski et al. supra note 8, at 1196; Smith & Levinson, supra note 20; Task
Force Report, supra note 20.
30. See generally Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in Juror Decision-Making: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 599
(2009) (discussing bias salience).
31. The client gets to decide whether to testify, whether to request a jury, and what to plead.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011) (“In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by
the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive
jury trial and whether the client will testify.”).
32. Lois Heaney, The Case for Meaningful Voir Dire on Race and Sexual Orientation Bias, 3
CAL. ST. B. CRIM. L.J. (2001), available at http://www.njp.com/articles/CaseForMeaningfulVoir%2
0Dire.pdf.
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examples, I will illustrate how we must address racial biases to ensure
they do not hurt our clients or our clients’ cases.
B. Defense Attorney Bias When Interacting with Clients
One example of how racial bias can interfere with client communication comes, again, from my own experience. One thing that is a part of
criminal defense work—indeed, all criminal law—is salty language. I
have heard it, have used it myself, and have had it used toward me.
Nonetheless, no one likes being yelled at or sworn at. On one particular
occasion, I represented a young man in a death penalty case. He was
about twenty, African-American, and a member of a gang. I went to the
jail to discuss some decisions we needed to make and their consequences. We were in Division One of Cook County Jail, in what used to be the
law library but is now denuded of books and serves as the room for attorney-client visits. It is in the basement, always damp, and the tables are
like picnic tables with attached seats. I explained my client’s options and
my assessment of the consequences of the two directions in which we
could proceed. Suddenly, he started swearing at me and raising his voice.
“Fuck a consequence! I don’t give a damn about no fucking consequence. Fuck You!”33 I tried to continue the conversation, but that only
made it worse. Finally, I had had enough and I left.
Shortly after that encounter, I attended a lecture about developmental disabilities. I learned that one of the ways someone with a developmental disability compensates for not being able to understand is to act
tough to cover it. I realized that I had not been seeing “an angry black
man.” I had been seeing someone with developmental disabilities who
was covering it up. Many people mistakenly believe that one can merely
look at a person and tell that he is disabled.34 In fact, there is an expectation that developmentally disabled people look like someone with Down
Syndrome or have other facial indicia of their malady, even though most
often this is not the case.35
I saw the stereotype, and instead of asking myself why my client
was angry and trying to understand his reaction, I got angry too. After I
understood this, I learned to introduce only one new idea to this client at
a time because that was all he could process. And the next time I had a
33. I referred to this incident, albeit in much less detail, in a previous article, But He Doesn’t
Look Retarded: Challenges to Jury Selection in the Capital Case for the Mentally Retarded Client
Not Excluded Under Atkins v. Virginia, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 701, 712 (2008).
34. Shruti S. B. Desai, Effective Capital Representation of the Mentally Retarded Defendant,
13 CAP. DEF. J. 251, 266–67 (2001).
35. Michael L. Perlin, “Life is in Mirrors, Death Disappears”: Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N.M.
L. REV. 315, 334–35 (2003).
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client yell at me in that way, I said, “Whoa, whoa. What did I say just
now that didn’t make sense to you?”
The work defense lawyers do is difficult and emotionally draining.
There are many ways to handle stress, and not all of them are healthy.36
One of them is humor. We all tell jokes in stressful situations, even at
tragic situations or funerals. Humor relieves stress.37 But those jokes can
also become a way to dehumanize our clients or the victims of crime, and
they get in our way as advocates. If we do not see our clients as people
worth voting for, how on earth will a jury?
This insight leads me to another personal example that does not
make me proud. I represented a deeply religious man, a fanatic even. He
had crosses tattooed on him; he quoted from the Bible all the time,
seemed unable to follow a logical conversation, often looked about the
room, and appeared to be listening to something I could not hear or see
(although, in retrospect, it might have been how he would stop to think).
Overall, he seemed a bit crazy to me. One day, I came back to my office
from the jail, frustrated with our inability to communicate. In that meeting, I had needed to tell him some hard truths about our ability to fight
his case, but he did not want to listen. We needed to make some decisions, and he did not want to make them. So, he refused to make them,
and then outright refused to talk to me any further about it, knocking on
the door to be taken back to his cell. “I will leave this in God’s hands,”
he said as he left. I was angry and told my office partner and some other
public defenders who were around that I had “no problem with leaving
things in God’s hands, but damn it, couldn’t God file an appearance [as
counsel of record] so I could withdraw?”
Everyone, including me, laughed. My comment was funny, and it
relieved tension at the time, but it also showed that I had not listened to
my client. I saw his religiosity as an impediment to communication, but
if I had seen him as a person instead of a symbol of the “crazy religious
client,” I would have realized much sooner that he wanted spiritual advice, not legal advice. Eventually, I figured it out and got a friend of
mine, Sister Miriam Wilson,38 to speak with him. And I had to ask myself whether my own secular biases prevented me from helping him
36. Alcoholism is a common problem in the legal profession. See, e.g., Nathaniel S. Currall,
Note, The Cirrhosis of the Legal Profession—Alcoholism as an Ethical Violation or Disease within
the Profession, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 739 (1999). Some programs are even aimed to help
attorneys stop their drinking habits. See, e.g., LAWYERS’ ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, http://illinoislap.
org/about-lap (last visited Feb. 5, 2012).
37. See Patty Wooten, Humor an Antidote for Stress, 10 HOLISTIC NURSING PRAC. 49, 49–55
(1996).
38. Sister Miriam was a prison chaplain at the Cook County Jail for many years and worked
tirelessly against the death penalty until her own death ten years ago.
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sooner.39 Or, might I have seen it sooner if my client shared my demographic background—in other words, if he had been white and Jewish? I
cannot know for sure, but I suspect the answer is yes. My biases got in
the way of seeing what my client needed, and while this bias was only
tangentially related to race, race was not absent.
C. Defense Attorney Bias During Jury Selection and Voir Dire
Another area in which our bias as defense attorneys can be especially harmful is during voir dire and jury selection. Voir dire is when our
clients exercise their Sixth Amendment right to question potential jurors
before trial.40 This right allows them the chance to weed out individuals
who may hinder a fair trial.41 Defense lawyers should generally look for
responses and attitudes that might “affect a juror’s ability impartially to
evaluate the credibility of testimony or to draw inferences only from evidence presented at trial [that] are racial and ethnic prejudices.”42 Consequently, most scholarly research focuses on how attorneys can detect
racial bias among jurors.43 The importance of the inquiry during voir dire
is self-evident. But aside from discussing explicit racism in the context of
Batson challenges,44 legal scholars rarely analyze the internal racial biases that lawyers exhibit during jury selection. Scholars tend to overlook
decisions of defense attorneys particularly because we tend to have
nonwhite clients, and because of that, falsely assume that we are less
likely to have racial bias.45

39. See generally Daniel O. Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the
Role of Competing Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 1 (1993–
94); see also Geoffrey Fatah, Man Cites Religious Bias in Murder Trial, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 3,
2008, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/695249773/Man-cites-religious-bias-in-murder-trial.html.
40. See Nancy Lewis Alvarez, Comment, Racial Bias and the Right to an Impartial Jury: A
Standard for Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 965 (1982).
41. Id. at 959.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 959–60 (discussing “the importance of racial inquiry on voir dire as a method for
identifying jurors who should be excused because of their inability to separate racial attitudes from
the determination of the defendant’s guilt”); see also Heaney, supra note 32.
44. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (“The Equal Protection Clause guarantees
the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of
race, or on the false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as
jurors.” (citations omitted)).
45. This is true of everyone; we want to assume that we are not biased. See Smith, supra note
19, at 1081 (“According to Freudian psychoanalytic theory, the human mind protects itself from the
discomfort of guilt by refusing to recognize those ideas that conflict with what the individual has
learned are good or just. So when the individual ‘experiences conflict between racist ideas and the
societal ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his racism from consciousness.’” (quoting Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321 (1987))).
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In order to place this issue in context, it is important to discuss the
process of jury selection itself.46 Jury selection is a process of elimination
whereby a group of potential jurors are called for jury duty, and then
questioned and seated, excused for cause, or excused by a peremptory
challenge by either side. Generally, a juror challenged for cause has a
relationship with a party or witness, has some personal experience that
would cause him to be unfair, or is otherwise legally unable to sit. Determining whether a juror must be removed for cause often requires some
skills that are not necessarily comfortable for many (if not most) attorneys.
As one commentator writes, “Jury selection has three main goals:
(1) to elicit information from jurors, (2) to educate jurors on the defense
case and defuse the prosecutor’s case, and (3) to establish a relationship
between the jurors and the defense attorney and his [or her] client.”47 To
further these goals, the single most important thing a lawyer can do is to
listen. Some psychologists refer to this skill as “attending behavior,”
which includes demonstrating a relaxed attentive posture, holding eye
contact, and engaging in “verbal following.”48 Jury selection requires that
the attorney ask the juror questions about the issues in the case in order
to figure out what the juror thinks and feels, and to decide whether that
juror can hear the case or not.
Instead of using attending behavior to listen to potential jurors, defense lawyers often rely on basic and generalized stereotypes when they
pick juries. That is, they make assumptions based on jurors’ race, class,
gender, and other shorthand traits. Admittedly, to some extent, we must
rely on demographic data such as a person’s neighborhood, language, or
background to determine how they think and feel as decision-makers.
But because all people—lawyers, judges, and potential jurors alike—
have internal racial biases,49 when there is black defendant, prosecutors
and defense attorneys assume that a black juror will be more sympathetic
to the defense. In the many voir dire examinations I have done, opposing
counsel almost always assumed that the defense wanted to keep the black
jurors if our client was black. Such an approach, however, does not
46. I am drawing on some of my earlier writing for this Part, in particular Naming the Dragon:
Litigating Race Issues During a Death Penalty Trial, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1647, 1653–61 (2004).
47. Cathy E. Bennett, Psychological Methods of Jury Selection in the Typical Criminal Case,
SELECTED MATERIALS ON TRIAL PRACTICE, NATIONAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE COLLEGE MANUAL,
HOUSTON, TEXAS, 55 (1977). See generally Herald P. Fahringer, In the Valley of the Blind: A Primer
on Jury Selection in a Criminal Case, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 116 (1980).
48. Verbal following is when one listens to exactly what the other person is saying and responds to it, rather than introducing a new topic. DAVID R. EVANS ET AL., ESSENTIAL
INTERVIEWING: A PROGRAMMED APPROACH TO EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION 25, 31 (8th ed. 2011).
49. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1196.
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acknowledge the many differences among black people in their views of
crime and criminal justice, and ignores the fact that black people are
more often the victims of crime than whites.
To some extent, we must rely on the demographic data we can get
our hands on. But stereotypes are dangerous. Perhaps because of the
pressure of having to see a number of potential jurors in too short a time,
many lawyers rely upon so-called “hunches” and consequently jump to
conclusions about that juror, which have little or no basis in fact. Many
of us, for example, have a temptation to classify people according to
physical appearance. We may jump to the conclusion that the man with
the square jaw is a person with great determination, or that the person
with red hair has a hot temper, or that the individual with close-set eyes
is not to be trusted. We all know, of course, that such conclusions have
not the slightest validity. We are similarly trapped by our racial assumptions—that a black juror is good for a black defendant or that a Mexican
juror will identify with a Puerto Rican defendant.
If we are using this process of elimination based on stereotypes, jurors will know it. And then we cannot get angry if the jurors return the
favor by making the assumption that our young male minority client is
guilty, a gang member, or otherwise dangerous and not deserving of respect.
IV. CONCLUSION
In articles about seemingly intractable problems like racial bias,50
there is always a conclusion about what needs to be done, in which the
author usually proposes more education. I am certainly in favor of more
education, but I do not believe that it is merely education that is needed
here. I think our focus as advocates is to develop a willingness to be introspective, to face our own biases, and, as advocates, to put the client
first. After all, as was evident on that day in the lockup with Paul, we are
able to do this work only because of our clients. And we are all human.
This means we are imperfect. But as legal advocates, it is our duty to
recognize our imperfections and work to ensure that they do not harm
our clients. We must continuously strive to recognize our own consciousness so that everything we do is in their best interest. To borrow
50. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) (noting that “the Baldus study indicates a
discrepancy that appears to correlate with race” but that “[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an
inevitable part of our criminal justice system”). The McCleskey case is infamous for the Court’s
outright refusal to take action regarding any of the racial disparities shown through the Baldus study
in Georgia. Most chillingly, the Court decided that acting on McClesky’s argument and Baldus’s
research would “throw into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice
system.” Id. at 315.
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from the late Michael Jackson, we need to start with the man (or the
woman) in the mirror.51

51. From the middle of the song: “I’m starting with the man in the mirror/I’m asking him to
change his ways/And no message could have been any clearer/If you want to make the world a better
place/Take a look at yourself, and then make a change.” MICHAEL JACKSON, Man in the Mirror, on
BAD (Epic 1987).

